benefit from a more extensive discussion, one that perhaps takes into consideration similar claims about the Enlightenment as "network" or "system" by Chad Wellmon, Clifford Siskin, and others.
The uncertainty of the book's broader argument is also visible in the individual "cases," some of which do a better job organizing the exhibits than others. It is not always clear, for instance, why an exhibit belongs in one case rather than another. Could not Milton's bed, for example, which focuses on inspiration and origination, just as easily be placed in "Conception"? The looseness of the categories also allows some of the discussions to stray from the subject of the mind. "Inwardness" and "Dispossession" raise a host of issues from the relations of privacy, interiority, and sexuality (see the discussion of Walpole's Mysterious Mother, to the related issues of possession, selfhood, and loss (see the discussions of Pope's Rape of the Lock and Jonathan Wild, . On the one hand, these sections signal the capacious nature of Silver's organizing concepts; but on the other, as they stray from the book's strengths and attention to the mind, they inevitably leave broad subjects undertreated. These organizational issues clutter a linear reading process, and for Silver's purposes, we can see "cluttered" as an entirely appropriate formal description. But clutter can also compromise clarity, which might have helped the book's fascinating ideas and interpretations take root.
Altogether, the cursory qualities of the book's curatorial form lend it its greatest advantages and drawbacks. The Mind Is a Collection is a rare academic book that invites a DIY practice it also studies. One of its chief lessons is indeed that getting our hands dirty and leaving the matter messy, so to speak, can invigorate our treatment of seemingly tidy philosophical issues. In its novel conceit and engrossing presentation, Silver's study gives fields as diverse as eighteenth-century literature, philosophy, brain science, and material history much to work with. It will surely be an essential resource-a proverbial inventory, storehouse, or bed-for any study interrogating the interactions between the mental and the physical during this period that set in motion philosophical conversations about the mind that continue to occupy us in the present.
Thomas Salem Manganaro Duke University
Marcel O'Gorman, Necromedia. Posthumanities 33. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015, 231 pp. $87.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.
Necromedia is an ideal book for posthumanism. It makes a posthumanist argument in a style reminiscent of Cary Wolfe's What Is Posthumanism? It gives a precise theoretical perspective for questioning various forms of art, including film, literature, and digital media. Like Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology," it questions technology from the perspective of the human. Unlike Heidegger, its driving interest is affirmation.
O'Gorman refers to the book as "an examination of how, in contemporary culture, the technical aspect of the human has collided with the symbolic aspect, resulting in a situation where technicity itself has become the basis for heroic recognition" (p. 3). O'Gorman's thinking is motivated by "two universal and inevitable elements of human being: death and technicity" (p. 4). Technicity is straightforward enough, covering handheld tools to digital technology, but "death," "the symbolic aspect," and "heroic recognition" need more elucidation than O'Gorman provides. This lack of clear definition of terms early on is one of the few weaknesses of the book. In light of the rest of the book, "death" refers to physical death, but also connotes a sense of meaninglessness that interactions with technology are meant to defy. That is to say, when people seek a sense of "heroic recognition" via technics' interface, they do so in order to feel fulfilled and to overcome the finitude of an embodied existence. "Heroic recognition" is a term derived from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, who, according to O'Gorman, suggests that "Homo sapiens is characterized not only by its technical striving but by its symbolic striving" (p. 3). An example that comes to mind is an old Jaguar commercial with the tagline "How Alive Are You?" O'Gorman takes on the manufactured satisfaction found in commodities and mass media, and situates it in relation to human striving for symbolic meaning.
After the short introduction, the book's chapters alternate between applications of theory and discussion of digital media, typically presented as art installations. O'Gorman structures the book this way in an "attempt to marry media theory and digital practice in a hybrid narrative about death and technology" (pp. 5-6). The first chapter introduces O'Gorman's theoretical perspective in more detail.
"Necromedia" refers to the book's guiding and posthumanist principle that "to fully acknowledge human finitude is also to acknowledge our own technological being. All media, . . . by pointing at once to both our technicity and finitude, are necromedia" (p. 15). O'Gorman does not mean to say that media call attention to human finitude in a sea of displays and shifting lights. Rather, O'Gorman calls attention to human finitude to show how it has been masked in the use of technology. For O'Gorman, contemporary culture is too motivated by "the challenge posed by technology, which demands for ever new and more sophisticated methods of self-extension and selfarchivation" (p. 23). The strength of O'Gorman's arguments throughout the book stems from the fact that he clearly sees this limited interaction with technology as a problem. As such, Necromedia prescribes "a technics of applied media theory, a mode of humanities scholarship designed to produce an alternative technoculture" (p. 15). This would require "transforming . . . media theorists into media artists" so that art can challenge the metanarrative of disembodiment with projects that question and draw out the values of the human audiences (p. 15).
Such an argument requires a unique theoretical backing; this is where O'Gorman takes his inspiration from Ernest Becker. O'Gorman frames Becker's thought as an "existential curative" that deals "straightforwardly not only with death but with evil, morality, religion, and love" (p. 18). Becker's focus on social values like these is reflected in O'Gorman's concern with the waning importance of the body in our technophilic culture. Becker's work depicts humans as at the mercy of society, either as depressed individuals sedated by social expectations (pp. 19-20) , or as introverted individuals whose self-reflection only reminds them of their impotence to defy social expectations (p. 22). There is a third option, the defiant self-creator, whose social and technological relations are driven by their need to assert themselves over such expectations, often using media to extend and archive their sense of self (p. 23). Entering into this third, aggressive type is sometimes the response to the sedation and impotence of the first two types. Necromedia hopes to find a way out of these too-subdued or overly aggressive ways of being, showing that O'Gorman's take on posthumanism is not just a theory of subjectivity, but a Nietzschean discussion of health and fulfillment in society.
The second chapter is named after the video installation it describes: Border Disorder. O'Gorman recounts how he filmed two separate crossing of the Canada-to-US border after 9/11, one while driving, the other while running the Detroit Free Press International Marathon. Splicing the two videos together, the result is Border Disorder, a cacophony of bouncing, runner-mounted video, car radio, static, and darkness in the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, and shouts by border guards working the international barrier during the marathon. The chapter and resulting video are meditations on the congruence of death, security, technology, and a perceived lack of humanity at the border. In this and the other even-numbered chapters on media installations, O'Gorman uses art to lay his posthumanist cards on the table: he is concerned with the inseparability of technology and humanity, how they emerge together at birth, and how they collide in death.
Following these first media theory and installation chapters, the remaining chapters can be grouped under three conceptual concerns: death and technology, applied media theory and practice in the humanities, and O'Gorman's concern for the body. Chapters 3 and 5 develop the connection between death and technology. Chapter 3, "Telephone, Pager, 2 Way Speaker, and Other Technologies of Betrayal," focuses on technologies in American Beauty. This chapter's goal "is to 'test' some of Becker's theories regarding the relationship between death denial and existential authenticity, all in a cultural context that includes contemporary media technologies" (p. 40). This test does not really come out in this chapter though, but is more relevant to the fifth chapter. Instead, O'Gorman's reading of the film points out the use of technology in various scenes to escape or enforce normative social behavior. Like the film itself, the chapter is concerned with the sequence of events that lead up the murder of the everyman narrator, Lester Burnham.
In reading Lester's transition from a depressed individual to a defiant self-creator, O'Gorman focuses on communication technologies that betray their users. Lester asserts his defiant self-creation through the common communication technologies of the chapter's title: he calls an underage girl to assist his fantasy of her and pages his teenaged pot dealer. But while he does this, these technologies put him on a collision course with the people around him, revealing his call to his teenage daughter, revealing his wife's affair, and making the pot dealer's father suspicious. Trapped by a "dysfunctional use of communications technologies" (p. 41), Lester's death seems inevitable.
O'Gorman's discussion of American Beauty is compelling because the role he attributes to everyday technologies supports the theory laid out in the first chapter. There is a fatalistic tension in O'Gorman's reading, though, and the reader is left to wonder: Does the presence of technology always facilitate death in this way? Does it always punish those trying to escape social expectations? Chapter 5, "Angels in Digital Armor," suggests technology is not the determining influence of violence. On the contrary, our concerns should extend beyond technology to the value systems that drive its use.
"Angels in Digital Armor" takes on the challenging topic of school shootings and the influence of video games. Taking neither of the expected sides of the issue, O'Gorman notes that "very few critics have pointed a finger at the potentially dangerous rehearsal platform facilitated by online journals, blogs, personal websites, Facebook and even chat" (p. 90). "Social networking platforms, rather than computer games," he argues, "should be the object of attention for those who are interested in studying, and intervening in, terrorist-style school violence" (p. 90). What makes these social networks so concerning is that they are often the space where people enact defiant self-creation, and do so according to the norms of an online identity such as World of Warcraft, which offers customers "opportunities to make heroic choices, a sense of belonging to a responsive and committed community, and the chance to achieve instant recognition for their actions" (p. 72). Social networks and the spread of online celebrity engender a desire for recognition and immortality, while online games give people a sense of identity by which they can be recognized. All that is valuable in the "real world" is exposure; because the late capitalist value system is not concerned with what is displayed, people carry over identities from idiosyncratic, and sometimes violent, spaces into the public space, all in a search of recognition.
The lives at stake in this argument insist on its serious consideration. Both the living who seek recognition in media and who die in tragic violence are subject to a "culture that values technology, wealth, and consumption above all else; . . . a culture in which value is meted out in shiny boxes packed with circuits and in abstract bits of code that scroll by horizontally at the bottom of a television newscast" (p. 88). O'Gorman's writing about this violence is levelheaded and clear. Playing out the "test" from chapter 3, he identifies the anthropologically and philosophically defined need to feel like an authentic self and shows how this need is manipulated by technology to deny human finitude, often yielding tragic results.
Chapters 7 and 9 apply O'Gorman's perspective to media and objects. Chapter 7, "Speculative Realism Unchained," begins this by departing from two fields of thought associated with posthumanism and applied media theory: speculative realism and object oriented ontology. O'Gorman argues that these philosophies "serve to entrench the human animal's identity as a being that is desperate to both deny its finitude and achieve recognition" (p. 110). O'Gorman focuses on these fields' practice of list making, and finds that "pondering the infinite possibilities of object being" is not viable for attending to the finitude of life (p. 120). O'Gorman does praise the work of Jane Bennet, whose "horizontalizing ontology is a vehicle of ecocritical care" (pp. 113-114). But this kind of care is lacking in practices such as Ian Bogost's "digital version of carpentry," which "misses an opportunity to engage in a richer diversity of philosophical carpentry" (p. 123), one that uses objects to draw attention to finitude rather than celebrates turning the human into an object. Readers who are skeptical of these fields will likely find the chapter persuasive and its arguments intuitive; readers invested in these fields may find it too conservative.
Chapter 9, "Digital Care, Curation, and Curriculum," builds on previous references to care in Jane Bennet's work advocating for humanities scholars to build "objects to think with" to remind people of their finitude (p. 138). This is a chapter on methodology that shows a concern for the question of technological determinism raised by the earlier reading of American Beauty and offers a praxis for the digital humanities to resist the technological determinism of late capitalism. O'Gorman calls on scholars to "get their hands dirty" (his emphasis) and to try "inventing their own critical technological objects, even at the risk of having them turn out to be nothing more than broken tools or toys" (pp. 137-138). Although shifting toward objects, O'Gorman maintains that the value of "deep and careful reading," which is so methodologically important for texts, is also necessary for attending to objects (pp. 145-146) . This generates something that could perhaps be called an applied object theory. O'Gorman does not use this term, but what is so striking in the chapter is how a substantive focus on objects calls attention to the body, and how it makes clear that scholars have been ignoring their embodiment for a long time.
This opens up the last conceptual focus of O'Gorman's book, the body. The body has clearly been present in several chapters discussed above, as has O'Gorman's perspective on its value. In the chapters on media installations, bodies appear as objects to think with. For instance, chapter 10 is on a piece called Roach Lab. Part of this installation is a "two-channel video" showing a cockroach dissection on the left and the disassembly of a mechanical roach on the right (pp. 168-169). The video ends when the live cockroach is completely disemboweled and has finally stopped twitching. This assemblage of roach, machine, human hands, and dissecting tools "brings into relief the border between animality and technicity"; O'Gorman calls it "a theater of horror" (p. 169). What may be most unsettling about it is that the video also ends with the mechanical roach being reassembled and switched back on.
The body is best deployed as an object to think with in chapter 4's Dreadmill and as a biopolitical object of care in chapter 11, "From Dust to Data: On Existential Terror and Horror Philosophy." "From Dust to Data" deals with the distinction between terror and horror and how these characterize a response to violence. The bodies at stake in this chapter are victims of suicide bombers and animals. O'Gorman relies on Anne Radcliffe's distinction between terror and horror from "On the Supernatural in Poetry" (p. 175), best summed up as the claim that "terror is above all a sense of dread in the face of unknowability. Horror, on the other hand, presents us with a hard-core certainty" (p. 188). Applied to the question of responding to violence, the distinction is that violence is terrifying when humans imagine its effects on the living and horrifying when humans observe its effects on corpses.
In order to flesh out the understanding of horror, O'Gorman refers to Adriana Cavarero's Horrorism. "Horrorism" is the violence against bodies in what is typically called terrorist attacks (p. 179). Cavarero's point is that such violence realizes an ontological indignity on the bodies of the dead (p. 177). Although Caverero's view is anthropocentric, in that animal bodies cannot elicit horror (p. 180), O'Gorman uses this idea to develop a standard of ethics in a complicated but particularly compelling section. Here he integrates Cary Wolfe's discussion of Cora Diamond and J. M. Coetzee from What is Posthumanism? According to O'Gorman, the central character of Coetzee's The Lives of Animals calls for understanding humanity "in such a way that to respect the ontological dignity of the human would require not putting nonhumans to death" (p. 181). This comes to define the idea of a "terror philosophy" (p. 184). Understanding violence against animals as a horrifying affront to human dignity drives human decision-making by framing the imagination of animal corpses as terrifying. The real corpse is horrifying; the imagined one terrifying. Either way, the human animal recognizes the need to avoid it. O'Gorman goes on to distinguish this from the "horror philosophy" of OOO thinkers like Eugene Thacker. When OOO tries to actualize the human as one flattened object among many, it "eschews contemplation of human finitude for the sake of reveling in the indefiniteness of being, which is also a gesture toward infinity" (p. 189).
O'Gorman's idea of a terror philosophy relies on "retaining uniqueness for the human animal, a uniqueness based primarily on the human's awareness of mortality" (p. 184). Of course, it would be difficult to prove that this awareness is genuinely unique to humans. But what matters for the argument is the human ability to imagine an outcome of its behavior and act to avoid it. Understanding violence toward both humans and animals as a horrifying affront to humans' ontological dignity suggests that human dignity is in part defined by its capacity to refrain from violence. As such, O'Gorman's posthumanist argument, his care for finitude and embodiment, cannot escape the decision-making faculty of the human: the faculty to judge its motivations according to its sense of mortality, perhaps mor(t)ality, and act accordingly. O'Gorman frames this as a sense of taking responsibility on the last page of the book, and his argument is all the stronger for it: "In the end, we must acknowledge that we ultimately choose what vulnerabilities to recognize and not recognize, and that this choice is the center of our ethical and moral debates" (p. 191). Although O'Gorman gives the standard definition of posthumanism at the beginning of the book, as a "philosophy that denies humanism's conception of the autonomous, self-possessed subject" (p. 16), it feels only perfunctory. The need to exercise judgment in a moral sense and take responsibility for actions, especially violence, as if we are autonomous subjects, suggests that this critique has limited driving force for posthumanist argu-ments. O'Gorman's book is built on the critical force of something more affirmative: an honest revaluation attendant to embodiment.
Given this perspective, it seems best to end on the most memorable image of the body in the book, chapter 4's performance art piece, Dreadmill. Instead of describing the piece in prose, the book features a script that O'Gorman read to audiences while walking and running on a treadmill. The speed is included alongside the dialogue and ranges from four to ten miles per hour. The script itself is fairly expected based on the rest of the book: it tells the audience that their existence has always been technological and refers to Heidegger's idea of technology turning people into a standing reserve for technological activity. What is striking, though, is that at the end there is no more dialogue, and the treadmill speed reads, "Continue until exhaustion" (p. 69). O'Gorman mentions earlier that he runs marathons, so this must have taken a long time. What is it like to watch a body exhaust itself while going nowhere? What is it like to watch a mind exhaust itself while doing nothing? The real question is, What is it like to watch human striving exhaust itself? This is the memorable conflation of the piece, how it uses the body to depict the mental exhaustion of always engaging with information technology. It prompts a question for the audience and the reader: "How exhausted are you?" and, perhaps more importantly: "How long have you been The first thing to note is that this is an excellent book. Its content is interesting, cogent, lucid, and a valuable resource for understanding contemporary culture. All four of these aspects are not always present in academic books. In Of Remixology, David J. Gunkel addresses what remix means and the questions it raises about cultural verities that most people take for granted. In doing so, he creates a new philosophical space for articulating a cultural transition that may have begun over a century ago but has accelerated in recent years.
Throughout the book, Gunkel mixes, or remixes, philosophy from Socrates and Plato to Derrida and Deleuze with DJ Danger Mouse, Girl Talk, and Negativlandand this is only a partial list of his extensive range of resources. Although readers of Configurations can be expected to be interdisciplinary, it will be the rare person whose knowledge thoroughly spans these domains. In my case, I know much more about music history, technologies, and the history of collage than I do of philosophy. Nonetheless, I do have some passing familiarity with the philosophers he references, and to me he gets them right. Even better, his paraphrases of nuanced, complex philosophical points might be the best I have read anywhere. His musical knowledge is also spot on-although I have some quibbles (more on that later). Readers interested in contemporary music, copyright law, and post-stucturalist philosophy will definitely be interested in this book. But as I have been implying thus far, I would suggest that anyone interested in contemporary culture should read this book.
Remix is a term taken from contemporary technical music production that has expanded into other arts and technologies. Remix has much in common with other
